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INTRODUCTION
It has been less than twenty years since American courts first began
to recognize that sexual harassment at work might fall within Tide
VII's prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.
1
In that time, courts have expanded the definition of actionable sexual
harassment to include not only sexual demands that are implicitly or
explicitly tied to denial or receipt of a job benefit or sanction (quid pro
quo sexual harassment), but also conduct that has the effect of altering
• LL.M. 1995, University of Michigan Law School; LL.B. 1993, University of British
Columbia. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Law
Foundation of British Columbia and the Canadian Bar Association.
1. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 E Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976); Barnes v. Costle, 561 E2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044
(3d Cir. 1977).
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the conditions of the plaintiffs employment by producing a hostile or
abusive working environment (hostile environment sexual harassment).2
Coincident with this expansion in the nature of the conduct that may
ground an employer's liability has been the development of a detailed
framework within which the plaintiff must fulfill her burden of proving
a prima facie case of sex discrimination. It is now generally accepted
that a plaintiff, in order to make out a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment, must show that:
(1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on sex;
(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working
environment; and
(5) employer liability.3
This article considers the unwelcomeness requirement of the plain-
tiffs prima facie case. In particular, it examines the discussion of
unwelcomeness found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 and the content given to this element by the
subsequent decisions of lower courts. Such an inquiry reveals several
parallels between the approach of courts to sexual harassment claims
and their traditional treatment of the criminal offense of rape. The
same biases and erroneous assumptions that have hampered an effective
response to the physical violation of women have permeated the appli-
cation of the purported remedy for their psychological violation on the
job.5 The effectiveness of potential remedies for this unfairness should
2. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 E2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
3. Hemon, 682 E2d at 903-05. The courts then follow the basic structure of proof of
a Title VII discrimination daim. Once the plaintiff has made out her prima facie
case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
existence of this difference in treatment. The onus is then on the plaintiff to prove
that the proffered reasons are a mere pretext for illegal discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
4. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. Of course, many sexual harassment suits include complaints of physical violations
that could amount to criminal sexual assault. Similarly, rape is both an invasion of
the victim's physical integrity and a repudiation of her equality and human dignity.
Sexual harassment and rape are not only at times accomplished through identical
[Vol. 3:125
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be evaluated in light of the underlying reasons for the errors made to
date by the courts. If the framework ultimately chosen for proof of
hostile environment sexual harassment claims is constructed in a
manner that recognizes the reasons behind the reality of women's
experiences at work, it may have transformative potential not only for
discrimination claims under Tide VII, but for the treatment of rape by
the criminal law.
I. DEVELOPING THE UNWELCOMENESS REQUIREMENT
A. Early Cases
The first appellate decision to recognize that a sexually hostile work
environment violated Tide VII did not mention the issue of
unwelcomeness.6 Rather, it discussed the substance of the claim in a
general way by analogy to the existing quid pro quo cases. However, by
the time the Eleventh Circuit handed down its decision in Henson v.
City of Dundee,7 the elements of a hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim had begun to be defined with some precision. In setting out
the five components of a plaintiffs prima facie case, the court in
Henson relied on the guidelines recently issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which suggested that hostile
environment sexual harassment was a violation of Title VII-and
defined sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture.... ."' The Eleventh Circuit interpreted this to mean that the
plaintiff must show that she "was subject to unwelcome sexual harass-
ment."9 Despite the absence of an unwelcomeness issue on the facts of
the case, the court defined this requirement to mean that the ...
conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not
acts, they also stem generally from the same exercise of domination over women
and the rejection of their equal humanity. This renders the parallels in their legal
treatment far from surprising.
6. Bund, 641 E2d at 934. The D.C. Circuit did note that there "was little or no
basis in the record" for the comment of the district court that Bundy "took a casual
attitude" toward the sexual advances. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 941-42.
7. 682 E2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
8. 29 C.ER. § 1604.11(a) (1981).
9. Henson, 682 E2d at 903 (emphasis in original). Given that the EEOC defines
sexual harassment as conduct that is unwelcome, the modifier is redundant.
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solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the
conduct as undesirable or offensive."1 This definition remains the
standard for plaintiffs bringing a Title VII sexual harassment claim.
B. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In formulating this definition of unwelcomeness, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the district court decision in Menitor Savings Bank v.
Vinson." This case eventually would be the first sexual harassment claim
to be considered by the Supreme Court. Mechele Vinson was employed
for four years by the defendant bank, during which time she was pro-
moted from teller-trainee to assistant branch manager. She alleged that
during this time the branch manager, Sidney Taylor, subjected her to
repeated demands for sexual intercourse, fondling in front of other
employees, indecent exposure, and numerous instances of forcible rape.
Vinson testified that she initially refused Taylor's demands for sex, but
out of fear of losing her job, eventually submitted to him some forty or
fifty times.
Taylor denied that any sexual activity had occurred. He testified
that Vinson had in fact made advances toward him, which he declined.
Taylor also suggested that Vinson had brought her suit to exact revenge
after a dispute about whom the plaintiff was to train to be head teller.
The district court rejected the plaintiff's claim. Under the heading
"Additional Findings," the trial judge noted:
If the plaintiff and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual
relationship during the time of plaintiffs employment with
[the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one by plaintiff
having nothing to do with her continued employment at [the
bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution. 12
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court of
appeals held that the trial judge had erred in failing to consider whether
the plaintiff had proven that she was subjected to sexual harassment by
10. Henson, 682 E2d at 903.
11. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D. D.C. 1980), rev'd. 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g en banc denied, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
affld sub nom. Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) [hereinafter
Meitor].
12. Meritor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 42.
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way of a hostile work environment.' 3 The conclusion that the plaintiff
had not been the victim of sexual harassment was therefore open to
question. After referring to the passage quoted above, the court stated:
This finding leaves us uncertain as to precisely what the court
meant. It could reflect the view that there was no Title VII
violation because Vinson's employment status was not affect-
ed, an error to which we already have spoken. Alternatively,
the finding could indicate that because the relationship was
voluntary there was no sexual harassment - no "[u] nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment." If, however,
the evidence warranted a finding of sexual harassment by that
standard, Vinson's "voluntar[iness]" had no materiality what-
so ever. 14
Relying on its recent decision in Bundy v. Jackson,5 the D.C.
Circuit noted that an employee was not required to prove resistance to
sexual advances in order to make out a Title VII claim. The court
concluded:
A victim's "voluntary" submission to unlawful discrimination
of this sort can have no bearing on the pertinent inquiry:
whether Taylor made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment
a condition of her employment. 6
In a footnote, the court noted that the trial judge's unexplained finding
of voluntariness may have been predicated on the "voluminous testimo-
ny regarding Vinson's dress and personal fantasies." 7 The court rejected
the relevance of such evidence on the ground that "a woman does not
waive her Title VII rights by her sartorial or whimsical proclivities."'"
The defendants' application for a rehearing en banc was denied.
Judge Bork (joined by Judges Scalia and Starr) dissented from this
denial on several grounds. Judge Bork argued that the decision of the
13. The court of appeals also found other errors relating to the treatment of employer
liability and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in the plaintiffs case in chief.
14. Meritor, 753 E2d at 146 (footnotes omitted).
15. 641 E2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16. Meritor, 753 E2d at 146 n.36.
17. Meritor, 753 E2d at 146 n.36.
18. Menitor, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36.
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court of appeals meant that "the supervisor charged may not prove that
the sexual behavior, far from constituting harassment, was voluntarily
engaged in by the other person, nor may the supervisor show that the
charging person's conduct was in fact a solicitation of sexual
advances." 9 Thus, "sexual dalliance, however voluntarily engaged in,
becomes harassment whenever the employee sees fit, after the fact, to so
characterize it."'2° Judge Bork also disagreed that evidence of the
plaintiff's dress or behavior was irrelevant, particularly if evidence of the
supervisor's behavior toward other employees was admissible."
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist,
struck a middle ground." The Court agreed that sexual harassment, in
both its quid pro quo and hostile environment forms, was actionable
sex discrimination under Tide VII. On the issue of voluntariness, the
Court agreed with the court of appeals that the district court had erred
in concluding that the voluntary nature of the sex barred relief. The
Court interpreted the word "voluntary" as referring to the complainant
not being "forced to participate against her will."23 "Voluntariness" was
not a defense to a Tide VII claim since "[t]he gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come."'
24
The Court distinguished these two concepts in the following
terms: "The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct
'indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary."25
19. Meritor, 760 E2d at 1330. The language of the "supervisor charged" and the
"charging person" are incongruous in the civil context. Judge Bork's use of terms
more appropriate to a criminal prosecution emphasizes that his concerns-that the
woman wanted it, that she was in fact the aggressor, and that she can and will
invoke the legal system after the fact-are those historically raised in the context of
the crime of rape.
20. Meritor, 760 E2d at 1330.
21. Meritor, 760 E2d at 1330-31.
22. Merntor, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Justice Marshall's concurring opinion deals primarily
with the question of employer liability. Thus Justice Rehnquist is speaking for a
unanimous Court on the welcomeness issue.
23. Menitor, 477 U.S. at 68.
24. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
25. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 68. The trial judge did not explain his use of the word "volun-
tary." The District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court interpreted it to
mean acquiescence in the sexual acts, as opposed to forcible compulsion at the time
of penetration. In other words, they took the trial judge to mean that the acts were
not the crime of rape. Judge Bork, dissenting from the denial of the rehearing,
(Vol. 3:125
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However, the Court disagreed that evidence of the "complainant's
sexually provocative speech or dress"26 was necessarily irrelevant to the
issue of unwelcomeness. The district court, on remand, would have to
weigh the probative value of such evidence against its potential for
prejudice to the plaintiff.7
II. DEFINING UNWELCOMENESS
The content of the unwelcomeness requirement is being developed
by the courts on an ad hoc basis, apparently by reference to judicial
common sense. Few decisions have considered the appropriateness of
such an element in the prima facie case, or the ways in which it might
operate to reinforce workplace inequality between women and men.
Fewer still have recognized the ways in which this requirement, and the
manner in which it has been applied, have rendered civil actions for
sexual harassment in employment startlingly similar to the highly criti-
cized traditional criminal rape prosecution. 2 The next section of this
article identifies those parallels, relying on the content given to the
unwelcomeness requirement by various trial and appellate decisions.
A. The Presumption of Consent
Generally speaking, the element of unwelcomeness serves the same
function in sexual harassment actions that the element of non-consent
interpreted the trial judge's use of the word "voluntary" as being synonymous with
"wanted" or "welcome." This led him to assert that the defendant was being
"denied the right to prove that the 'victim' is not that but a willing participant."
Metor, 760 F.2d at 1330.
26. Mefitor, 477 U.S. at 69.
27. It is worth noting some of the more general problems with the decision in Meitor
itself. First, and most fundamentally, the trial judge made no finding of fact as to
whether the sexual conduct took place. It is the duty of the fact-finder to arrive at
an affirmative conclusion as to whether a given event occurred or not. The finding
of voluntariness, hinging as it does on the provisional conclusion as to the inter-
course actually occurring, is infirm. Moreover, neither Vinson nor Taylor argued
that the intercourse was voluntary, consensual, or welcome. Vinson argued that it
was compelled; Taylor denied that it ever happened. Meritor, 753 F.2d at 143-44.
In this context, the finding of voluntariness could only be based on the judge's view
of the kind of person Mechele Vinson was.
28. Susan Estrich makes a similar point in her article Sex at Work, 43 STAr. L Ray.
813, 815-16 (1991). Estrich confines her article primarily to harassment by supervi-
sors; this article considers welcomeness in the context of harassment by coworkers as
well.
19951
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
does in a criminal rape trial. First, by making non-consent, or unwel-
comeness, a part of what the plaintiff/prosecution must prove before
the defendant is required to answer, the structure of the claim presumes
that the woman bringing the complaint consented to or welcomed the
conduct. In the context of a sexual harassment action, this means that it
is presumed that the woman found the alleged conduct to be welcome.
This is true even where a hostile work environment claim is based on
sexual advances or physical touching. That the plaintiff proves by
credible testimony that these events happened is not enough to establish
a prima facie case; she must also prove that she did not want them to
happen.
This presumption of consent has produced similar doctrinal conse-
quences in both criminal rape law and in the law of sexual harassment.
This suggests that the same assumptions that have led to vigorous
criticism of the law of rape persist in the minds of judges in the sexual
harassment context: namely, assumptions about the nature of women
and their relationships with men. The remainder of this article will
discuss the parallel elements of the two legal claims, the shared fallacies
on which they are based, and the manner .in which the tort of sexual
harassment can be modified to better fulfill its avowed purpose of
ensuring equality for women in the w6rkplace.
B. Structure of the Claim/Elements of the Offense
The traditional criminal law formulation of the offense of rape is
that of sexual penetration of a woman, not the wife of the perpetrator,
by force and against her will. The majority of states still require proof
of the two elements of force and non-consent.29
29. See, e.g., KAN. STvn. AN. § 21.3502 (1988); CAI. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West
1993). Some jurisdictions have amended the offense so that it is defined solely by
reference to force. See, e.g., AL. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520b(1)(0 (West 1991). Nonetheless, in jurisdictions where consent is
not provided as an express defense, courts have steadfastly read the element of non-
consent back into the offense. See, e.g., People v. Stull, 127 Mich. App. 14, 338
N.W.2d 403, 406 (1983) (noting that although consent is not an element under
the statute, "consent is dearly admissible to show lack of force or coercion").
Conversely, some jurisdictions have eliminated the force requirement such that the
sole issue, on the wording of the statute, is non-consent. See, e.g., ALAs A STAT. §
11.41.410 (1989). However, the presence or absence of force is generally treated as
relevant to non-consent.
[Vol. 3:125
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In general, the element of force can be satisfied in one of two
ways. First, the prosecution can show that the defendant gained sexual
access to the complainant through the application of actual physical
force. Second, the prosecution can meet the "by force" requirement by
showing that, while no actual force was applied, intercourse was ob-
tained by the use of threats. The class of threats considered sufficiently
severe to be deemed "force" is generally restricted to those threats that
engender a fear of death, abduction, or grievous bodily harm. Those
who criticize the traditional formulation of the criminal law of rape
point to the erroneous assumptions underlying the requirement that the
prosecution prove both force and non-consent. Such a structure pre-
sumes both that the presence of force is consistent with consensual
intercourse, and that the complainant considers the sex unwanted is not
enough, in and of itself, to constitute the offense of rape. 0
In a hostile environment sexual harassment claim the plaintiff must
show that the conduct on which her lawsuit is based was unwelcome.
As noted above, this requirement functions as a non-consent standard
for sexual harassment. The plaintiff must also show that the unwelcome
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter her condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment.31
This is known as the "unreasonableness" requirement.32 There is, of
course, no per se requirement that a plaintiff prove force as part of her
prima facie case in a hostile environment claim under Tide VII. How-
ever, the unreasonableness and unwelcomeness elements offer an inter-
esting parallel to the force/non-consent duality of criminal rape law.
To prove that the harassing conduct was unreasonable, the plaintiff
must meet two standards. First, she must demonstrate that her working
environment became, for her, hostile and abusive (the subjective test).
30. See CATHARNE A. MAcKiNNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 245
(1984) (advocating a compulsion standard and arguing that lack of consent is
redundant); but see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YAE LJ. 1087, 1132 (1986) (advocat-
ing a consent standard as empowering women, but considering forcible penetration
potentially compatible with consent). One could also argue that rape should be
defined solely by reference to a consent standard, with proof of compulsion
amounting to proof of non-consent and thus being redundant.
31. This requirement is based on the wording of Tide VII, the scope of which extends
to situations in which discrimination has affected "terms, conditions or privileges of
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). If the harassment is not suffi-
ciently severe and pervasive to alter the plaintiffs working environment, it is not
considered to have affected a "condition" of employment.
32. See 29 CER. § 16 04 .11(a)(3) (1989).
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Second, the plaintiff must also show that a reasonable person would
have considered such a working environment to be hostile and abusive
(the objective test).
The presence of an objective standard indicates that some verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature, even if unwanted by and unwel-
come to the plaintiff, is not actionable sexual harassment. Some degree
of harassment is thus permissible, regardless of its effects on the plain-
tiff, because it does not possess the characteristics that render it objec-
tively unreasonable. The goal of this additional requirement is assertedly
to protect employers from the "hyper-sensitive" plaintiff.34 But it also
defines sexual harassment by the court's standard, leaving the defendant
free to harass, as long as he does so mildly and occasionally. This
ostensibly holds true even in cases where a defendant knows of a plain-
tiffs particular susceptibility and is well aware that he is making her
working environment intolerable.
Moreover, the existence of the unreasonableness requirement, when
coupled with the unwelcomeness requirement, also means that it is
possible for a court to find that, notwithstanding the existence of an
objectively hostile and abusive workplace, these working conditions
were welcomed by the plaintiff.35 Just as force and consent are not
treated as inherently inconsistent in the criminal law of rape, objectively
severe or pervasive sexual harassment is considered potentially consistent
with welcomeness 3
6
33. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The objec-
tive standard ignores the fact that, in civil suits, reasonableness tests are generally
applied to defendants, not plaintiffs. It also runs contrary to the "thin skull" rule
applicable in intentional tort claims.
34. Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). Similarly, force requirements
in rape law are defended on the ground that accused persons must be protected
from the false testimony of complainants that would be impossible to rebut if
consent were the only issue.
35. Reed v. Shepard, 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
36. In practice, once the court makes a finding of welcomeness, it summarily concludes
that the harassment was not subjectively severe or pervasive. This means that it is
the presence of the objective component that renders the two elements distinct. See
Estrich, supra note 28, at 833. Estrich argues that the subjectivity of the
unwelcomeness element is fundamentally at odds with the other elements of the
claim, which are measured objectively. This renders the unwelcomeness element
either gratuitous or punitive, depending on the outcome of the reasonableness
inquiry. I agree with this assessment, although it does not necessarily lead to the
[Vol. 3:125
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C. Sexual History of the Plaintiff
In some cases, defendants have attempted to introduce evidence of
the prior sexual behavior of the plaintiff. This has met with mixed
results. Some judges have denied defendants' requests to cross-examine
plaintiffs -about their prior sexual behavior on the grounds that such
evidence is not logically probative of any matter in issue in a Title VII
sexual harassment suit.37 Other cases have permitted some discovery of
the plaintiff's sexual history as relevant both to the question of what
conduct the defendant thought was welcome, and to the issue of
whether the plaintiff actually found the conduct unwelcome. 8 Still
other decisions contain extensive discussions of the plaintiffs sexual
background without indicating which party sought to introduce such
evidence, and for what purpose.39
For example, in Richardson v. Great Plains Manufacturing Inc.,4"
the plaintiff argued that she had been subjected to sexual harassment by
several coworkers and supervisors at the farm implement manufacturing
plant at which she worked. The defendant employer moved for summa-
ry judgment. Richardson testified that she was subjected to lewd com-
ments about her appearance, unwanted touching, sexual propositions,
explicit comments by others about their own sexual behavior, and
obscene jokes and cartoons. The court noted the defendant's evidence
that the plaintiff participated in and initiated many of the
conclusion Estrich advocates, that the unwelcomeness element be abandoned. The
courts could just as easily decide to measure unwelcomeness on an objective stan-
dard as wen1, and consider whether a "reasonable person" would have welcomed the
defendant's actions.
37. See, e.g., Priest v. Rotary, 98 ER.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
38. Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (allowing em-
ployee discharged for sexual harassment to depose victim regarding her sexual
conduct with other employees during her employment, and of which the discharged
plaintiff had knowledge). The court declined to extend the evidentiary shield rules
of the Iowa Code to the case, since it was a wrongful dismissal suit and not a sexual
harassment claim. Id. at 314. See IowA CODE § 668.15(1) (1991).
39. See, e.g., Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (noting that plaintiff had been terminated from a previous job following
an attempt to "solicit a date" from a married company foreman, but not mention-
ing reasons that plaintiff left any other prior employment); Perkins v. General
Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989), affd in relevant part, 911
F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991) (findings of fact includ-
ed childhood and marital abuse of plaintiff).
40. No. 93-1028-PFK, 1994 WL 324553 (D. Kan. June 30, 1994).
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conversations. The court then went on to summarize the testimony of
the plaintiffs psychologist, Dr. Schmidt. The court did not indicate
which party called Dr. Schmidt as a witness, or on what basis his
testimony was relevant or admissible. Yet, the court used his testimony
as the basis for a detailed recitation of the course of the plaintiffs personal
life since the age of eight, including repeated molestation as a child and
sexual assault as a teenager. The court also described the plaintiffs
troubled marital history and the problems of the plaintiffs daughter.
These observations formed the basis for Dr. Schmidt's opinion that
the plaintiff was "especially prone to guilt and can very quickly feel
victimized" and "is a dependent and manipulative person who relies
heavily upon flirtatious behavior to relate to men."41 The court treated
this testimony as evidence of welcomeness.
42
In addition to using a plaintiffs history of sexual or physical abuse
to suggest that she is oversensitive, mendacious, or sexually aggressive,
at least one decision has considered the relevance of the plaintiffs
sexually related activity outside the workplace to her threshold of
unwelcomeness. In Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries,43 the plain-
tiff worked in a stereo speaker manufacturing plant. She was repeatedly
propositioned and touched by the plant owner, who asked her to pose
nude for him and showed her advertisements for Playboy videos. She
was also subjected to sexual slurs and comments from her supervisor
and coworkers. The harassment intensified when the supervisor told the
other workers that Burns had posed nude for two motorcycle maga-
zines. The magazines were circulated around the plant.
The trial judge found that the plaintiff had not been subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment during her employment at the plant. He
reached this conclusion in part because, "[i]n view of plaintiffs willing-
ness to display her nude body to the public in Easy Riders [sic] publica-
tions, crude magazines at best, her testimony that she was offended by
sexually directed comments and Penthouse and Playboy pictures is not
credible." 44
41. Richardson, 1994 WL 324553 at *6.
42. The court declined to grant summary judgment on the unwelcomeness issue,
finding that there was a real factual dispute on this point. The court did grant
summary judgment for the employer on the basis that the evidence clearly support-
ed the company's argument that it took prompt and effective remedial action.
Richardson, 1994 WL 324553 at *7--*8.
43. The first decision was reversed and remanded in Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992). The first trial decision is appended to the decision
on remand, 807 F. Supp. 506, 511 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
44. Burns, 807 E Supp. at 514.
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The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that the findings that the
sexual advances were unwelcome and that they were not offensive to
Burns were inherently inconsistent. However, the court concluded that
while Burns did not solicit any of the conduct that occurred, the gossip,
lewd talk, and petition to fire her were "incited by the nude photo-
graphs."45 Therefore, this aspect of the work environment had to be
considered separately from the owner's advances, which had persisted
throughout the plaintiffs employment. Relying on the holding of the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings" that a plaintiffs sexually provoca-
tive speech and dress are relevant to welcomeness, the court held:
... in making the determination as to whether the conduct
directed at Burns was unwelcome, the nude photo evidence,
though relating to an activity engaged in by Burns outside of
the workplace, may be relevant to explain the context of some
of the comments and actions directed by [the owner] and
coworkers to Burns.47
On remand, the district court judge again found for the defendant.
He explained that his earlier finding that the owner's advances were
unwelcome, but not offensive, was not internally inconsistent. The
district court judge was of the view that the accepted definition of
"unwelcome" 48 required the plaintiff to show both that she did not
solicit or invite the conduct and that it was offensive to her. In this
case, the plaintiff had failed to meet the latter half of this disjunctive
test. While the sexual advances were not solicited or invited, this alone
was insufficient for a prima facie showing of unwelcomeness:
If offensiveness is to be determined by plaintiffs reaction to
the particular conduct of a particular person, then a finding
45. Burns, 955 E2d. at 565.
46. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
47. Burns, 955 E2d at 565. It is difficult to understand how such photos relate to the
issue of unwelcomeness, except in the fashion adopted by the trial judge in this
case. The only conceivable situation in which such photos might be relevant is
where a plaintiff needed to introduce this evidence in order to explain why other-
wise ambiguous comments of coworkers created a hostile work environment. In
such a case, however, it would not matter whether the plaintiff actually posed for
such photos, or that other employees merely said that she did.
48. Courts have held that such conduct must "'be unwelcome in the sense that the
employee did not solicit or invite it, and the employee regarded it as undesirable or
offensive.'" Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (quot-
ing Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cit. 1986)). See also
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cit. 1982).
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that the sexual advances were unwelcome would also
determine that they were offensive. On the other hand, if
plaintiffs reaction to the person whose conduct was not wel-
come is viewed separately from plaintiffs reaction to the same
conduct by someone else, the two findings are consistent. I
considered them as separate issues. If the answer to the first
question also answers the second question, why ask it? I deter-
mined from the record in the case including plaintiffs
personal history (which need not be set out here), her manner
of dress, her pierced, bejeweled nipples, the location of her
tattoo, her interest in having her nude pictures appear in a
magazine containing much lewd and sexually explicit material
and her appearance on the stand that the type of conduct in
which [the plant owner] engaged was not in and of itself
offensive to her.
49
The only coherent reading of this test is that it requires the plain-
tiff to show both that the conduct of the defendant was unwelcome,
and that such conduct would always be offensive to her, no matter
what its source. The plaintiff is, in effect, required to show that the
conduct is globally unwelcome or, in other words, that she is not that
kind of woman.
On a second appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected this disjunctive
approach, and entered judgment for the plaintiff.50 It was sufficient to
meet the unwelcomeness threshold that the owner's advances were
"uninvited and offensive."51 The fact that the plaintiff's photos had
appeared in the magazines was not probative of this issue:
The plaintiff s choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work
hours is not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her
employer's work-related conduct offensive. This is not a case
where Burns posed in provocative and suggestive ways at work.
Her private life, regardless of how reprehensible the trier of fact
might find it to be, did not provide lawful acquiescence to
unwanted sexual advances at her work place by her employer. 52
49. Burns, 807 E Supp. at 508-09.
50. Burns, 989 E2d 959, 966.
51. Burns, 989 E2d at 962. Note that this phrase in essence repeats the test used by
the trial judge, although the court says that it is repudiating it.
52. Burns, 989 E2d at 963.
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The decision of the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings53
indicates that it is not in all circumstances unreasonable to relate the
provocative attire and behavior of the plaintiff to the question of
whether the acts complained of were unwelcome. It is unclear from the
decision whether the inquiry is limited to the dress or speech of the
plaintiff that occurs in the workplace and is known to the defendant.
How much of it will be considered depends on the standard that is
used to define unwelcomeness. If the focus is on the defendant's state
of mind, and whether he knew that his conduct was unwelcome, then
everything about the plaintiff known to the defendant is potentially
relevant. This would logically include behavior or statements that the
plaintiff made outside the workplace, if it can be argued that they shed
light on what she would welcome from him at work.
Yet if a purely subjective inquiry into what the plaintiff was actu-
ally feeling is required, it is possible that all of her speech and behavior
that the defendant can dredge up will be admissible. Once it is accepted
that such evidence is at all logically probative of this issue, there is little
justification for excluding any of it. Thus, even in the case where a
court focuses solely on whether the evidence indicates that the plaintiff
found the alleged harassment unwelcome, and not on whether the
defendant also believed it to be unwelcome, the court can choose to
rely on at least as much of this same type of evidence in concluding
that the sexual conduct was in fact welcomed. The result is an inquiry
into what type of person the plaintiff is, and whether that type of
person would have wanted to be propositioned, touched, or spoken to
in the way that the defendant chose.
This approach is familiar to the rape prosecution, and is at the
core of the widespread criticism that rape law puts the victim, rather
than the accused, on trial. The character of the complainant was ex-
pressly relevant in the rape legislation found in many jurisdictions in
the first half of the twentieth century.54 Gradually, rape statutes were
redrafted to omit reference to the character of the victim, such that the
law ostensibly recognized that all women could be raped.55 Nonetheless,
53. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
54. See, e.g., Dallas v. State, 79 So. 690 (Fla. 1918) (stating that, when charged with
the offense of "carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of
eighteen years, of previously chaste character," the prosecution must prove chastity
beyond a reasonable doubt; even if the complainant is chaste in fact, a reputation of
unchastity provides a defense).
55. The obvious exception to this trend was when the woman's status was that of wife
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
courts persist in scrutinizing the sexual behavior of the complainant as
relevant not only to the defendant's belief in the plaintiffs consent, but
also to the issue of consent itself, as well as to the complainant's mo-
tives and her credibility.5
6
Certain assumptions about the relevance of a woman's sexual
behavior are necessarily implicit in this approach. If, in the context of
sexual harassment, the plaintiffs prior sexual behavior is considered
relevant to what conduct she actually did find welcome, this means that
all of the plaintiffs sexual activities with others are considered legally
probative of the issue of whether the defendant's conduct, in the
workplace and on a given occasion, was wanted. Sexual acts are seen as
essentially fungible for women, both as to the partner with whom they
engage in them and as to the location in which they take place. This is
the impression left by cases such as Richardson v. Great Plains Manu-
facturing,'7 in which the court indulges in a far-ranging investigation of
the plaintiffs "background" in considering the defendant's contention
that there existed no factual controversy on the issue of unwelcomeness.
Richardson is also an example of the increasing attempts by defen-
dants in sexual harassment actions to rely on psychiatric opinion evi-
of the accused. Differences in the legal treatment of married women who lodge
complaints of rape against their husbands still persist in many jurisdictions. While
all jurisdictions now recognize that marital rape is a crime, many do not define it as
expansively as rape between persons who are not married to each other. Compare
MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. 5 750.5201 (West 1979) (limiting scope of spousal rape)
with MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b (West 1979) (listing categories of crimi-
nal sexual conduct, or rape).
56. See, e.g., Doe v. U.S., 666 E2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that evidence of
reputation for promiscuity was admissible to show defendant's state of mind);
Hardy v. State, 285 S.E.2d 547, 551 (Ga. App. 1981) (stating that evidence of use
of birth control and of prior sexual experiences of complainant in gang rape case
admissible on issue of mistake); State v. Shoffner, 302 S.E.2d 830, 832-33 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983) (stating that evidence that complainant frequently attended a club
where she was "attracting men," had consensual sex on a previous occasion with a
brother of one of the defendants, and was observed in a public place with a man
who was zipping up his pants, was admissible on issue of consent to show com-
plainant's pattern of acting as sexual aggressor); State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212,
1217 (N.H. 1988) (holding that evidence that complainant had publicly been
sexually provocative on night of rape was admissible); R v. Bogie, 1992 CrM. LR.
301, 302 (Eng. CA. 1991) (admitting testimony, on appeal, that complainant was
a "tart" and an "easy lay" and had sex on prior occasions with other men as relevant
to consent).
57. No. 93-1028-PFK, 1994 WL 324553 (D. Kan. June 30, 1994).
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dence about the plaintiff.5 Because the actual relevance of sexual
history evidence has been sharply criticized in the context of rape, and
evidentiary rules have been enacted to limit its admission, defendants in
sexual harassment actions may sense that reliance on such evidence as
outright proof of welcomeness may be considered inappropriate, unwise,
or open to review on appeal. Nonetheless, they are aware of the undeni-
able adverse impact on credibility such evidence has historically
produced. Similarly, judges are undoubtedly attuned to this general
disapprobation of the use of sexual history evidence in criminal rape
trials, but may also persist in viewing such evidence as highly probative
of the issue of welcomeness.
The ensuing attempts to have such evidence admitted indirectly
through expert psychiatric testimony mirrors a similar trend in rape law.
Increasingly, defendants in rape prosecutions have been seeking and
receiving disclosure of the psychiatric records of complainants.59 This
has held true despite the fact that defendants, through this mechanism,
are requesting much of the same evidence for largely the same purposes
as was the case when it was introduced directly.
In either area of the law, this view is premised on a belief, which
has proven difficult to dislodge, that charges of sexual misconduct are
easily and frequently fabricated by women who seek to exact revenge or
assuage their consciences. The illogicality of believing simultaneously
that a woman's character reveals her to be so sexually indiscriminate
that she must have welcomed the defendant's advances, and yet so
ashamed of her own enjoyment of them that she would go to the
58. Sometimes, this evidence is offered to show that the plaintiff is oversensitive, and
therefore that her injuries are unreasonable. Attempts to order psychiatric examina-
tions of plaintiff have met with mixed success. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court,
740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987) (stating that, by commencing action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising from sexual harassment, the plaintiff put her
own mental state in issue; defendants may require plaintiff to undergo psychiatric
examination to determine the existence and extent of plaintiffs injury); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 118 F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that an
allegation that the defendant's actions affected the psychological well-being of
plaintiff and would have similarly affected a reasonable person "is not informed by
evidence which might be obtained by a mental examination"); Bridges v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that an allegation
of mental anguish included in a Tide VII claim does not automatically put plain-
tiffs mental state in issue; defendants may depose plaintiffs' psychologists and
obtain their medical histories; questions about sexual history are unrelated to issue
of mental anguish, and thus are not permitted).
59. See, e.g., People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
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trouble of bringing a legal claim to assert that she did not, is
unexplained.
D. Appearance and Conduct of the Plaintiff at Work
Sexual history evidence falls along a continuum that scrutinizes
every aspect of a woman's existence so as to determine its sexual mean-
ing. These sexual meanings are in turn understood to indicate how
much credibility to accord a woman's claim that she has been injured
in a sexual way. At one end of this spectrum are the actual sexual
relationships of the plaintiff, real or imagined. At the other end are
what she wears, how she talks, and the company she keeps. Evidence of
actual sexual behavior is more damaging, but also more difficult to get
admitted, than evidence of speech or dress.
The remarks of the Supreme Court in Meritor with regard to the
relevance of provocative speech and dress have drawn sharp criticism
from many commentators.6" Lower courts, however, appear for the
most part to have embraced this directive with some vigor. In fact,
most decisions subsequent to Meritor contain no explicit indication that
the balancing of probity and prejudice envisioned by the Court was
ever carried out.61 Instead, the courts automatically scrutinize the ap-
pearance and demeanor of the plaintiff at work to determine whether
the conduct complained of was welcomed by her.62 Thus in Reed v.
Shepard,63 the Seventh Circuit noted, as part of its conclusion that the
plaintiff had enjoyed participating in the "objectively repulsive" behav-
ior that pervaded her workplace, that she had been "instructed to
suspend the exhibitionistic habit she had of not wearing a bra on the
days she wore only a t-shirt to work." '
60. Estrich, supra note 28, at 826-28; Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It? The
"Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L Rnv. 1558,
1573-74 (1992); Miranda Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN.
L. Rnv. 565, 577 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 E Supp. 1559, 1563 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (inaccurately describing the decision in Meritor as containing "explicit
instructions for the trial court to consider ... evidence of that plaintiffs provoca-
tive dress and expressed public fantasies"); Jones v. Wesco Investments, 846 F.2d
1154, 1155 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[a] court must consider any provoca-
tive speech or dress of the plaintiff .... .") (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Jones, 846 E2d at 1155 n.4 (observing from trial record that plaintiff wore
non-provocative dothing).
63. 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 487.
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Courts will consider the statements and conduct of the plaintiff in
the workplace as relevant to the issue of unwelcomeness. On its face,
such an approach seems logical. The obvious way for a plaintiff to show
that certain conduct was unwelcome to her is to provide evidence that
she either expressly stated that she found it offensive or harassing, or
acted in a manner that conveyed that message. However, courts have
also been willing to consider the entire history of the plaintiff's conduct
on the job, and not merely her reaction to the incidents that form the
basis of her suit, as potentially providing evidence that the alleged
harassment was actually welcomed by her.
In particular, some courts have found relevant to the issue of
welcomeness the plaintiffs use of crude and vulgar language, as well as
her participation in, or initiation of, sexually oriented conversations,
jokes, or gift giving.1S In most of these cases, the courts have recognized
that the workplace in question is permeated by sexual speech and/or
conduct, and has been since before the plaintiffs arrival. However, if
the plaintiff contributes to this atmosphere, this may prompt a finding
that she did not find such working conditions unwelcome.
Some courts have determined that the mere fact that a plaintiff is
shown to have behaved in a sexual manner at work does not bar a
finding that the alleged harasser's conduct was unwelcome.66 Nonethe-
less, such evidence is treated as clearly relevant to the issue of
unwelcomeness. Some cases have accommodated these concepts by
stating that a plaintiff who has participated in sexually explicit
65. See, e.g., Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (finding that plaintiff failed to prove evidence of intolerable working
conditions because plaintiff used crude and vulgar language and asked colleagues
about their sex lives and discussed her own); Richardson v. Great Plains Mfg., No.
93-1028-PFK, 1994 WL 324553 (D. Kan. June 30, 1994) (examining whether the
conduct was unwelcome by noting that plaintiff told dirty jokes, used obscene
language, and boasted of her sexual efforts); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d
651 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that plaintiff volunteered intimate details about herself
and her past); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (finding that plaintiff did not prove unwelcomeness because plaintiff partici-
pated in the pervasive sexual innuendo and vulgar storytelling); Loftin-Boggs v. City
of Meridian, Miss., 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (finding that plaintiff did
not make known conduct was offensive because plaintiff participated in and initiat-
ed crude language and storytelling, made jokes about the rumors circulating that she
was having an aflair with a supervisor, and expressed her displeasure with the
behavior of other employees by using sexually explicit gestures and foul epithets).
66. Swentek v. USAIR, 830 E2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 E2d
251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 94-4195-CV-
C-9, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9867 (W.D. Mo. June 29, 1995).
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conversations must make it clear to her colleagues that she will no longer
participate in such behavior and will hereafter consider it unwelcome.67
Such an approach, however, presumes that the plaintiff has in fact
changed her mind about whether the conduct is welcome and has not
merely decided to change her behavior, since her acquiescence to the
conduct has not improved her working conditions. Moreover, this
approach implicitly finds relevant the knowledge of the plaintiffs
colleagues that the conduct was unwelcome to her, and whether her
behavior adequately communicated that fact. It is not enough that the
plaintiffs behavior changes; it is also required that she publicly repent.
The decision of the Seventh .Circuit in Reed v. Shepard68 is an
example of a case in which the plaintiffs behavior was considered
determinative of the issue of welcomeness. The plaintiff was employed
as a civilian jailer in the Vandenburgh County Jail. She alleged sex
discrimination in working conditions, pay, and benefits, as well as
sexual harassment, contrary to Title VII. The district court appeared to
accept the plaintiffs testimony that she was handcuffed to various
structures, subjected to suggestive remarks and lewd jokes, punched in
the kidneys, and maced. As well, her head was forcibly placed in co-
workers' laps, an electric cattle prod was inserted between her legs and,
while she was handcuffed to the toilet, her head was pushed
underwater.
The Seventh Circuit found:
By any objective standard, the behavior of the male deputies
and jailers toward Reed revealed at trial was, to say
the least, repulsive. But apparently not to Reed.
Reed not only experienced this depravity with amazing
resilience, but she also relished reciprocating in kind.69
This conclusion was based on the testimony of other employees of the
department that Reed "had one of the foulest mouths in the depart-
ment," participated in the giving of suggestive gifts, enjoyed showing
male officers the abdominal scars from her hysterectomy, and initiated
many of the sexual jokes and innuendos.70
67. Weinsheimer, 754 E Supp. at 1564 n.12; Loftin-Boggs, 633 E Supp. at 1327 n.8.
68. 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
69. Reea 939 E2d at 486.
70. Reea 939 E2d at 487.
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Thus, general evidence of speech or conduct by the plaintiff that is
sexual in nature can provide the basis for concluding that her testimo-
ny-that she found specific acts of her coworkers unwelcome-is not
credible. The connection between the two is implicit: a woman who
would participate in sexual conversations at work is a woman who
could not really have objected to the sexual attentions of her fellow
employees. The defendant has shown that the plaintiff could not have
been injured by his sexualization of her since she was already sexually
defined.
E. Knowledge by the Harasser That His Conduct Is Unwelcome
Many courts have adopted the definition of unwelcomeness found
in the Eleventh Circuit decision in Henson v. City of Dundee,7 in which
the court noted that the conduct complained of must be ". . . unwel-
come in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in
the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive." 72 However, the cases are not consistent as to the relevance, if
any, of the harasser's lack of knowledge that the conduct was unwel-
come to the plaintiff. Most decisions appear to assume that all that is
necessary to satisfy this component of the prima facie case is that the
conduct be subjectively undesirable in the mind of the employee.73 This
issue is often not explicitly discussed, since frequently the plaintiff has
at some point made known to the harasser or to her employer her
objection to the conduct in question.
In a few of the cases that have considered the issue, however, the
courts suggest that a lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant
that his conduct was unwelcome is relevant to the issue of welcomeness.
For example, in Mitchell v. Hutchings,4 the court granted in part the
plaintiffs' motions to quash deposition subpoenas of persons with whom
the defendants believed the plaintiffs to have had sexual relationships. The
71. 682 E2d. 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 903. See, e.g., Wyerick v. Bayou Steel, 887 E2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989);
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 118 F.R.D. 525, 528 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Lynch v. Des
Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Iowa 1990).
73. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 E2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "'the threshold for determining whether conduct is unwelcome' is
whether it was uninvited and offensive").
74. 116 EM.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
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court rejected most of the defendants' arguments as to the relevance of
this evidence, holding that the plaintiffs' sexual activity outside the
workplace was not relevant to their susceptibility to harm from sexual
harassment.75 However, the court permitted the defendants to depose a
coworker who was alleged to have been held down by other coworkers
while one of the plaintiffs fondled him. The judge noted:
[E]vidence relating to the work environment where the alleged
sexual harassment took place is obviously relevant, if such
conduct was known to defendant Hutchings. This evidence
can establish the context of the relationship between plaintiffs
and Hutchings and may have a bearing on what conduct
Hutchings thought was welcome.76
In Canada, the law of sexual harassment is modeled closely on the
leading American cases.77 Thus, the Canadian plaintiff is also required
to prove that she found the conduct of her supervisor or coworker
unwelcome. Moreover, knowledge by the defendant that his conduct
was unwelcome has been incorporated into the definition of
unwelcomeness by many decision makers.7 The plaintiff must prove
that the defendant knew that his conduct was unwelcome; the legisla-
tion of the various jurisdictions and the reported decisions are divided
over whether constructive knowledge is sufficient. 79
The cases that express concern about the defendant's level of
knowledge, either directly or through the imposition of communication
requirements on the plaintiff,80 are, consciously or not, drawing a
75. Mitchell, 116 ER.D. at 484-85.
76. Mitchel4 116 ER.D. at 484.
77. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, (1989) 1 S.C.R. 1252, (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982); Meritor Savings v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986)).
78. Since the majority of Canadian sexual harassment claims are adjudicated by arbitra-
tors or administrative tribunals and not by the courts, earlier decisions are not
binding on subsequent ones.
79. See, e.g., Re Ottawa Bd. of Educ. and Employees' Union (1989) 4 L.A.C.(4th) 171,
180-81 (Bendel) (declining to apply constructive knowledge standard found in
Ontario human rights legislation in the context of employee termination grievance;
arbitrator notes that test is whether employee had actual knowledge that his advanc-
es were unwelcome); Zarankin v. Johnstone (1984) 5 C.H.R.R. D/2274, D/2281
(B.C. Bd.), affd, (1985) 6 C.H.R.R D/2651 (B.C.S.C.) (stating that no reasonable
basis existed on which employer could have concluded that employee enjoyed his
conduct; employer knew or should have known that it was one-sided).
80. See infra notes 84-109 and accompanying text.
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parallel between the sexual harassment claim and the criminal offense of
rape."' Where non-consent is an element of the offense of rape, the
mens rea of the defendant with respect to that element is in issue.
Therefore, the accused can argue that he believed that the victim was
consenting. If this assertion is accepted, it negates the mens rea with
respect to an essential element of the offense, and the accused must be
acquitted. While the sexual intercourse may have been unwanted by the
woman, it is not considered rape because the defendant was unaware of
her lack of consent.
In Mitchell v. Hutchings,2 a sexual harassment case, the court
implicitly recognizes a defense of mistaken belief in welcomeness8 3
When such an approach is accepted in the sexual harassment context,
the defendant can assert that, given his understanding of whom the
plaintiffs were, he believed that his conduct at work would be wel-
comed by them. This means that the dress, appearance, and sexual
history of the plaintiff known to the defendant become relevant to the
question of whether she was sexually harassed whenever the defendant
thinks such matters are relevant. Also relevant is any other external
factor that influences his attitudes about women, including information
about "the way women are" that is culled from pornography, mass
media or other men. Such an approach would permit sexist stereotypes
to bar a claim whose very purpose is to redress attacks on women's
equality in the workplace.
It is of course possible to impose a reasonableness requirement on
the defendant; his belief that the plaintiff welcomed the advances must
then be a reasonable one in order for him to rely on it in court.
Analogous provisions exist in the criminal rape laws of many
81. In fact, the difference between Canada and the United States in the relevance
accorded to the defendant's knowledge of unwelcomeness in the sexual harassment
context mirrors the difference in emphasis on the defendant's knowledge of non-
consent in criminal rape law. Some U.S. jurisdictions, typically those with both
force and non-consent requirements, have no honest belief defense for rape. See,
e.g., State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984). Those that do require that
the mistaken belief be a reasonable one. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d 441 (1992) (en banc). By contrast, prior to recent untested amendments to the
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which require the accused to show
that he took reasonable steps to ascertain the presence of consent, all that was
required in Canada for an acquittal was that the belief in consent be honestly held.
R. v. Pappajohn, 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C. 1980).
82. 116 ER.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
83. Id.
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jurisdictions.8 4 Yet the futility of this approach, in either context, is
clear; the courts have themselves provided troubling indications of what
sort of evidence they consider to be potentially probative of the issue of
welcomeness or consent.
F. Resistance
In order to prove the element of force in the offense of rape, the
prosecution at common law was required to show that the plaintiff
offered her "utmost resistance" to the defendant's actions.8 5 While this
"utmost resistance" requirement was gradually weakened by judicial
interpretation and legislative amendment, 86 the presence or absence of
resistance is still often considered relevant to the issue of force. NWhat
the prosecution must prove is sometimes described as the application by
the defendant of force sufficient to overcome resistance.87 Purportedly,
the failure of the complainant to resist is not determinative; she is not
required to offer resistance that would be futile. 88 In practice, however,
the presence or absence of reasonable resistance is routinely scrutinized
by judges in considering whether sufficient force has been proven.
The resistance requirement is related not only to the element of
84. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry 542 112d 1337 (Cal. 1975); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d
1266 (N.J. 1992).
85. See, e.g., Brown v State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906); Reidhead v. State, 250 P.
366, 367 (Ariz. 1926); State v. Holoubek, 66 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Iowa 1954); State
v. Hunt, 135 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Neb. 1965).
86. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); People v. Iniguez,
872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (discussing the historical evolution of the
resistance requirement in California).
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A) (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a)
(West 1996); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries 1980) (defining offense of gross sexual imposition in terms of
resistance of woman of ordinary resolution).
88. Futility is usually measured against the force the defendant was capable of applying,
given his size, his authority over the complainant, or his possession of weapons. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff'd
in part rev'd in part 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). However, it is occasionally judged
according to the force actually applied by the defendant. In other words, if the victim
is frozen with fear such that the defendant needs to use very little force, the court
may be more likely to say that the victim could have stopped his advances. The latter
approach favors the physically intimidating defendant. See, e.g., State v. Lima, 624
P.2d 1374 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 643 P.2d 536 (Haw. 1982).
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force in criminal rape law, but also to the question of non-consent. In
general, courts are reluctant to accept that, while there may be a logical
relationship between resistance and non-consent, the converse is not
necessarily true. Therefore, the onus is on the complainant to show that
she resisted in some tangible and overt way, either verbally or non-
verbally, such that either the defendant, or the court as reasonable
bystander, is convinced that she did not want to have sexual inter-
course. Simply put, silence 9 means consent.90 Thus the victim who
does not do anything, or who does not, in the court's view, do enough
to avoid the intercourse, is deemed not to have been forced and there-
fore to have consented. The relationship between the three elements has
been summarized as follows: "The force necessary to support a convic-
tion for rape. . . need only be such as to establish lack of consent and
to induce the victim to submit without additional resistance." 91
As noted above, the unwelcomeness requirement functions as a
non-consent standard for sexual harassment. 92 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, some courts have looked for evidence of resistance as proof of
unwelcomeness. In Kouri v. Liberian Services,93 the trial judge held the
plaintiff responsible for clearly communicating to the alleged harasser
that his conduct was unwelcome. 94 The plaintiff testified that, while she
and her supervisor initially enjoyed a close and friendly relationship, he
would not leave her alone. He personally escorted her to and from the
bathroom, instructed her not to speak to male coworkers, and walked
89. "Silence" here refers to a state in which the victim neither says nor does anything to
affirmatively indicate her lack of consent.
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garaffla, 656 A.2d 133, 135-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995);
State v. Bright, 890 P.2d 487, 490-91 (Wash. App. 1995); but see, e.g., People v.
Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
91. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217
(1986)).
92. This is not to say that the content of the two concepts is identical. The Supreme
Court in Meitor explicitly distinguishes the two; the trial judge's contingent finding
of "voluntariness" was interpreted by the court to mean that there was no force
sufficiently proximate to penetration to permit a finding of non-consent in criminal
law terms. The Court, in effect, says that the criminal rape law approach is too
restrictive to meet the goals of anti-discrimination law. By this distinction, the court
appears to envision an unwelcomeness standard that considers simply whether the
alleged sexual harassment was wanted by the plaintiff.
93. 55 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Va. 1991), affZ Kouri v. Todd, 960
F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Kouri v. Liberian Serv., 173 S. Ct. 189
(1992).
94. Id.
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her to her car every evening. He sent her cards, stood close to her, and
often rubbed her back. Whenever she was absent for illness, he showed
up at her home uninvited and implored her to return to work. On one
of these visits he hugged her so hard that he broke two of the stitches
in her back."
The plaintiff testified that, after she complained to higher manage-
ment, the defendant became hostile toward her. This hostility
culminated in the defendant accusing the plaintiff of having an affair
with a black employee and "describing in great detail what white
Louisiana boys used to do to black men caught messing around with
their women."
96
The court found that the harassment was not unwelcome. In
making this finding, the court principally relied on the fact that the
plaintiff did not make a sufficiently clear and serious demand to the
defendant that he stop harassing her. The court noted:
She indicated that she continually asked him not to touch her
and that she attempted to avoid his hugs, yet it seems certain
that her requests were not delivered with any sense of urgen-
cy, sincerity or force. In essence, she was sending out mixed
signals.9
In Kouri, the court suggests that a plaintiff cannot be heard to
claim that a supervisor's behavior is unwelcome unless she can show
that she did her best to avoid it. Evidence of "non-resistance" is evi-
dence that the conduct was not unwelcome. The reasoning in Kouri in
effect imposes a reasonable resistance requirement on the plaintiff in a
sexual harassment case. Specifically, the plaintiff is required to show
that she either took all reasonable steps to put an end to the
harassment, or that her failure to do so would not have made any
difference.
Most cases have not been so explicit in their consideration of
resistance. Nonetheless, there is widespread acceptance that the reaction
of the plaintiff at the time of the harassment is crucial to the determi-
nation of unwelcomeness. 98 In general, courts look for evidence that the
95. Kouri, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 126-27.
96. Kouri, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 128.
97. Kouri, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 129.
98. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 E2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990);
Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Loftin-
Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
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plaintiff indicated, at the time the harassment took place, that it was
unwelcome to her. Perhaps she expressed her displeasure to the harasser
or complained to higher management shortly thereafter. Where the
court is not satisfied that such verbal evidence exists, the plaintiffs
conduct assumes a certain prominence. The idea is that a woman who
really finds sexual advances or conversation unwelcome will vociferously
object from the outset and will continue to complain if the behavior is
repeated. In many cases, however, this is a wholly unrealistic paradigm
of the logical response to unwanted environmental sexual harassment.
Such cases often describe the plaintiffs working environment as perme-
ated with sexual innuendo, banter and horseplay.99 It is entirely reason-
able in such a situation to try to endure this atmosphere as long as
possible, since it appears endemic or integral to the workplace as a
whole. 100
If a plaintiff adopts such a tactic, however, she may find that it is
rarely possible to avoid being drawn into the workplace behavior in
some way. In Spencer v. General Electric,'1 the court noted that it was
well known in the office that the plaintiff and a male coworker objected
to the sexual behavior that permeated the working environment. As a
result, they were treated as "outcasts" by their fellow employees and by
their supervisor.' °2 Ostracism for refusal to participate in sexual behavior
at work may itself become a form of harassment. Coworkers may, for
example, exaggerate the hiding of sexually explicit materials from the
plaintiff and tease her for her delicate sensibilities or prudishness." 3
It is therefore hardly surprising that plaintiffs may resign them-
selves to joining in. This may mean weathering the comments and
advances good-naturedly, or it may mean more active participation.
Such participation may actually be perceived by the plaintiff as a form
99. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F Supp. 204, 213 (E.D. Va. 1988),
affd 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding sexual "horseplay" rampant in office);
Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1990)
(finding workplace "replete with sexual innuendo, joke-telling and general
vulgarity"); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing
working environment where there was the "typically raunchy language and activities
of an R-rated movie, and the antics imagined in a high-school locker room.").
100. See Estrich, supra note 28, at 847 (noting that "what the powerless must tolerate
because of their need becomes what the law defines as acceptable conduct").
101. 697 F Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988).
102. Spencer, 697 E Supp. at 214-15.
103. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 E Supp. 1486, 1501 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IUl. 1988).
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of resistance, a way of fighting fire with fire."°4 That these actions are
misplaced, since the result is typically a bigger fire, does not detract
from their purpose as tools of resistance.' 05
In Reed v. Shepard,0 6 the plaintiff was asked why she tolerated
behavior that she characterized in her lawsuit as harassing and abusive.
She responded:
Because it was real [sic] important to me to be accepted. It
was important for me to be a police officer and if that was
the only way that I could be accepted, I would just put up
with it and kept [sic] my mouth shut. I had supervisors that
would participate in this and you had a chain of command to
go through in order to file a complaint. One thing you don't
do as a police officer, you don't snitch out [sic] another police
officer. You could get hurt. 7
Agreeing with the trial judge's rejection of this explanation, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the conclusion that Reed welcomed "the sexual
hijinx[sic]" of her coworkers was strongly supported by the evidence.108
The Seventh Circuit referred to the evidence of three other women
employed as civilian jailers or deputy sheriffs who testified that the male
employees did not behave that way around women who asked them not
to. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court was justified in
concluding that ".... language and sexually explicit jokes were used
around plaintiff because of her personality rather than her sex."109
104. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F3d 1007 (7th Cir.
1994).
105. Participation in the sexualized environment as a form of resistance should not be
confused with confrontation of the harasser. This tactic of fighting fire with water
has proven effective in many cases. See generally, MARTHA J. LANGELAN, BACK OFF:
How TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARAsSMENT AND HARAssERs (1993).
106. 939 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
107. Reed, 939 E2d at 492 (quoting Tr. at 675).
108. Reed, 939 E2d at 492.
109. Reed, 939 E2d at 491-92 (quoting from unpublished opinion of district court
Judge Gene E. Brooks, dated May 25, 1990, p.28). This argument is akin to that
made by defendants in the early quid pro quo cases: the plaintiff had not suffered
discrimination based on sex because she was the only woman in the office to have
been propositioned. This supposedly made her injury personal, rather than group
based. This argument was rejected on the ground that, absent the plaintiff's group
affiliation, the harassment would not have occurred. Such an approach should be
uniformly rejected in the hostile environment context for the same reason.
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Note that the plaintiff in this context is provided with one accept-
able response: she must ask her coworkers to discontinue their behavior.
The presumption of welcomeness means that the defendant coworkers
bear no responsibility not to harass her in the first place. In order to
prove the element of unwelcomeness, the plaintiff must show that she
resisted, particularly since the resistance of other women apparently
proved effective. No consideration is given to the idea that the cowork-
ers may have chosen to concentrate their harassment on the plaintiff
because of her obvious and visible desire to fit in and her ensuing
tolerance of their behavior. Presumably, the male sheriffs could afford
to accede to the requests of other women to be left alone; after all, they
had Reed.
One might argue that the failure to require active objection perpet-
uates the notion that women are incapable of advancing their own
interests at work. This concern, however, overlooks the very real poten-
tial for retaliation by both management and coworkers. The plaintiffs
fear may be not a sign of weakness, but rather a realistic appraisal of
*what lies ahead. Where coworkers are the harassers, the plaintiffs desire
to belong and to respect the unwritten rules associated with a particular
profession may prevent her from objecting. The attempt of the plaintiff
in Reed to meet the informal demands of being a police officer is hardly
unique to her gender. Male jailers experiencing similar physical harass-
ment because of their race or "rookie" status would likely feel similar
pressure.
Ultimately, it is always the employee's responsibility to vindicate
her right to equality at work. She must complain to management and,
if unsuccessful, take the further step of initiating legal proceedings. The
plaintiff should not be penalized for her assessment of when and how
she should take action.
It is also significant that behavior that, earlier in the judgment, was
termed objectively "repulsive," is now described as amounting to sexual
"hijinx." The plaintiffs welcoming personality has transformed what
would otherwise be harassment into sex. This mutability between sexual
violence and sex is similarly a fundamental underpinning of the law of
rape. The type of person the plaintiff is defines her as open to further
advances because her personality indicates to her coworkers what she
would find welcome. In short, the plaintiff in Reed is given the status of
"welcome" mat, upon which her male coworkers are free to wipe their
feet.
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G. Recent Complaint
In a criminal rape trial, it has historically been crucial to the
complainant's credibility that she show that she reported the rape to
someone soon after it happened. In many jurisdictions, the doctrine of
recent or fresh complaint attained the status of an evidentiary rule.'
10
The credence to be given to the woman's complaint varied inversely
with the amount of time that had elapsed since the assault was alleged
to have taken place. This rule was based on the assumption that any
woman who was actually raped would be so distraught and outraged at
her violation that she would report it to the authorities or at least to
someone close to her."' Thus recent complaint was seen as probative of
whether sexual intercourse actually took place and, if so, whether it was
consensual.
In recent years, those who have studied and worked with rape
victims have challenged the validity of this rule. They point to the
many reasons that a woman would not want to report a rape, particu-
larly if it was committed by someone whom she knew and trusted. 1 2
Ironically, perhaps the most important of these is the distrust with
which such women are viewed by the legal system. Research reveals that
it is common for women to deny that they have been raped, either to
avoid self-identifying with the image of the "rape victim," or because
they are unaware that the acts that took place fall under the legal
definition of rape." 3
The sexist underpinnings of the recent complaint rule have been
recognized in several jurisdictions."' Yet these same jurisdictions have
110. State v. Lewis, 803 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Foskette, 568 N.E.2d 1167, 1170-71 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), rev. denied, 573
N.E.2d 984 (Mass. 1991); People v. Stripling, 557 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990); State v. Butts, 439 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Neb. 1989). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6; Dawn DuBois, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victims Prompt
Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK L. RaV. 1087 (1988).
111. Stewart v. State, 145 So. 162, 162 (Ala. Ct. App. 1932); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d
370, 374-77 (NJ. 1990).
112. SusA, ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10-15 (1987); Sherry E Colb, Assuming Facts Not in
Evidence, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 745, 752-55 (1994); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and
Reading about Rape; A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 979, 984 (1993).
113. SUSAN BROWNMII.ER, A AmsT OUR W: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 361-68
(1975); Schafran, supra note 112, at 1014-17 (detailing various studies).
114. People v. Brown, 883 P2d 949, 956 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); Battle v. U.S., 630 A.2d
211, 216-21 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993); HiA 578 A.2d at 375-76; State v. Kendricks,
891 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tenn. 1994).
[Vol. 3:125
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
retained the rule, ironically because "... . admission of evidence of the
complaint is appropriate in order to avoid the risk that the jury will reach
an improper conclusion on the basis of a factually erroneous inference to
the contrary." 1 '5 Thus, evidence of a prompt complaint is admissible in
the prosecution's case in chief as a sort of anticipatory corroborative
rebuttal."" The courts appear divided over whether the defendant may
make use of the complainant's failure to make a prompt report.
1 7
The prompt complaint concept reappears in -the law of sexual
harassment. Although there is no formal requirement that the plaintiff
complain to higher management immediately after the events occur,
both the presence and the absence of such a complaint are considered
relevant, not merely to the issue of employer liability, but also to the
questions of whether the events took place at all and, if so, whether
they were welcomed by the plaintiff."' Not surprisingly, reliance on
this factor is most pronounced in cases where the plaintiffs testify that
they were subjected to unwanted sexual intercourse.
For example, in Price v. Automotive Controls Corp.,"' the plaintiff
claimed that her foreman pressured her to have sex with him and at
times accompanied his propositions with threats that, if she did not
succumb, she would be transferred or fired. 120 After two years of this
pressure, she began a sexual relationship with him that included approx-
imately twelve instances of intercourse over a three-year period, and
which ended at her insistence. She further testified to being raped by
him in his office some eight months after the termination of the rela-
tionship. The foreman testified that the relationship was consensual.' 2 '
115. Brown, 883 P.2d at 958.
116. One commentator, testifying before a judicial committee on the subject, described
the anticipatory nature of fresh complaint evidence as akin to "telling the boy not to
put beans in his ear, when he never thought of doing so. . . ." Leigh Bienen, quoted
in Russell M. Coombs, Reforming New Jersey Evidence Law on Fresh Complaint of Rape,
25 RuTGERs LJ. 699, 707 (1994).
117. State v. Maniatis, 657 A.2d 149, 157-58 (R.I. 1995) (denying defendant jury
instruction on delayed complaint); Ronnie R. v. Trent, 460 S.E.2d 499, 505 (W. Va.
1995) (same); butsee Brown, 883 P.2d at 959 (allowing defendant to rely upon such
evidence).
118. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990); Rose v. Figgie Int'l Corp., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 41 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Robinson v. Thornburgh, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 324 (D.D.C. 1990).
119. No. 90-1193-JTR, 1994 WL 542086 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 1994).
120. Id.
121. Price, 1994 WL 542086, at *2.
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The district court found for the defendant, holding that the rela-
tionship was a welcome and consensual one.' The court relied in part
on testimony of other women at the plant that the defendant had
engaged in sexual relationships with them, but that the relationships
were entirely consensual. The court also relied on the evidence of
several other employees who- had been unsuccessfully propositioned by
the defendant, none of whom had viewed the advances as tied to their
job status. As to the allegation of rape, the court relied on the combina-
tion of the adverse impact on the plaintiffs credibility produced by the
finding that the relationship was consensual, and the fact that "Ms.
Price did not tell anybody of this alleged incident until over a year
later."' The court declined to find that the rape had occurred.
III. DIscussIoN
The comparisons made above show that, in some cases, sexual
harassment claims receive treatment similar to that of traditional crimi-
nal complaints of rape. Of course, it should be acknowledged that there
are many decisions that exhibit none of the attributes discussed above,
and that reject attempts by defendants to inject these same sorts of
considerations into the inquiry. While it is important not to overstate
the case, it must be recognized that the Title VII hostile environment
claim, as presently structured, permits the sort of approaches used in
the cases discussed above. In order to decide how to best avoid this
result, the flaws in the central premises of this reasoning must be iden-
tified and addressed.
A. Rape Law Reforms
The most obvious solution is to make the same kind of changes to
the law of sexual harassment that have been made to rape laws in the
last twenty years. These reforms include elimination of the recent
complaint 24 and resistance requirements 2 5 and limitations on the scope
of the mistaken belief defense. 126 While such initiatives in the area of
122. Price, 1994 WL 542086, at *8.
123. Price, 1994 WL 542086, at *4.
124. See supra part II.G.
125. See supra part II.E
126. See supra part II.E.
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sexual harassment should not be opposed, they are ultimately of limited
utility. The probative value accorded to such evidence is a product of
judicial reasoning, not of statutory provisions or procedural rules. In the
absence of explicit legislative direction as to the lack of value of such
evidence, it is up to judges to recognize its irrelevancy.127
This point is highlighted by the recent decision of the Court of
Appeal of California in Catchpole v. Brannon.2' The court of appeal
granted the plaintiff a new trial on her sexual harassment claim on the
ground that the trial judge, Superior Court Judge John E. Buffington,
was biased against the plaintiff because of her gender.12 The plaintiffs
claim was based in part on her allegation that the former assistant
manager of the fast-food outlet where she worked forced her to perform
acts of oral sex at his home. The defendant asked the plaintiff to come
to his home to discuss her problems with coworkers. 3 '
The court of appeal found that a strong impression of gender bias
was created both by the trial judge's repeated expressions of impatience,
in which he conveyed the sense that such cases were a misuse of the
judicial system, and by his use of sexist stereotypes in assessing the
appellant's credibility."' In particular, the trial judge asked the plaintiff
a series of questions suggesting that the plaintiff was either consenting
or at fault for going to the manager's home late at night and for not
resisting his conduct more forcefully. The court of appeal called this
"an unrealistic and gender-biased standard of reasonableness." 132
Appeals on the ground of judicial bias are rare; successful appeals
are even more unusual. Appellate courts accord considerable deference
to trial judges' assessments of witness credibility. The real problem with
the trial decision in Catchpole is not the lack of detailed evidentiary
guidelines, but the interpretation placed on the plaintiffs actions by
Judge Buffington.
The continued reliance of courts on sexual behavior evidence is
also seriously flawed. Evidence of the plaintiffs sexual relationships with
other men is not probative of the sort of attention she might welcome
from the defendant. Critics of the use of sexual behavior evidence in
127. Estrich, supra note 28, at 814-15.
128. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454.
130. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
131. Catchpok, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
132. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-51.
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rape law have amply demonstrated its lack of probative value and
undeniable, if logically inexplicable, prejudicial effect.1 33 It has been
suggested that the evidentiary shield rules used to limit admissibility of
a complainant's sexual history in rape cases be extended to cover sexual
harassment suits."' While this may provide some assistance to com-
plainants, such legislation typically does not reach the prior sexual
conduct of the complainant with the defendant. Moreover, the provi-
sions are difficult to apply in the hostile environment setting. Eviden-
tiary shield rules were enacted in part to counter the myth that a wom-
an who had consented to sexual intercourse in the past was more likely
to have consented to it with the defendant. Evidence of prior sexual
intercourse was thus deemed inadmissible. However, the sexual conduct
implicated in a hostile environment sexual harassment claim may be
entirely verbal or visual. In these cases, it is unclear what corresponding
behavior of the plaintiff should be ruled inadmissible.
The final difficulty with evidentiary shield rules is their limitation
to proceedings in which the woman harassed is a party. In particular,
such rules are of little assistance in wrongful dismissal suits launched by
employees terminated for sexual harassment. In one such case, the
female employee whose complaints prompted the termination sought an
order prohibiting discovery of her sexual history with other employ-
ees. 135 The court declined to grant the order despite the existence under
state law of evidentiary shield rules for sexual harassment claims.'
133. Zsuzsanna Adler, The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems of
Subjective Interpretation, 1985 CIum. L. Rnv. 769, 774-77; Vivian Berger, Man's
Triat Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1,
12-22 (1977); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal
Courts: A Proposal fr the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. Rav. 763, 791-801 (1986);
Elizabeth Kessler, Pattern of Sexual Conduct Evidence and Present Consent: Limiting
the Admissibility of Sexual History Evidence in Rape Prosecutions, 14 Womma's RTs.
L Rprit 79, 83-86 (1992) (criticizing the "pattern evidence" exception and Berger
and Galvin's acceptance of it); Jennifer Temkin, Sexual History Evidence-The
Ravishment of Section 2, 1993 CruM. L Ray. 3 (lamenting current English practice).
134. Juliano, supra note 60, at 1576-77; Paul Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admis-
sibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the p94
Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 4r2, 48 VAND. L REV. 1155 (1995).
135. Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 ER.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
136. Weiss, 142 ER.D. at 314. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 668.15(1) (West 1994).
Similar shield provisions exist in other jurisdictions, but most are limited to crimi-
nal cases. E.g., N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); MIcHi. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 750.520(j) (1991); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(2)-(4)
(West 1988).
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At its most basic, the welcomeness requirement is problematic
because it presumes that women actually have a choice about the sort of
environment in which they work. When women must point to some act
of resistance or objection to prove that the conduct of their coworker or
supervisor was unwelcome, the structure of the claim assumes that
compliance is not a necessary condition of the harassment. Consider the
analogous situation of the woman in a quid pro quo harassment context
who acquiesces to her supervisor's demands. The law is clear that this
type of participation, or lack of resistance, does not bar a claim. 37 Yet
in cases where no explicit or implicit threats or promises are made, courts
sometimes conclude that no woman would ever acquiesce unwillingly,
since there is nothing to be lost by resisting.138
This rationale is the same as that used to justify retention of a
resistance requirement in rape law. Such an approach ignores the coer-
cive and intimidating power inherent in the acts of sexual penetration
or sexual harassment themselves as they operate within societal con-
structions of gender roles. More simply, this assumption is belied by the
dramatic way in which the working environments of those who com-
plain about sexual harassment are often altered. A more fruitful line of
inquiry is why so many men feel so little hesitation to participate in the
creation of a sexually hostile working environment for their female
coworkers. Consideration of this question might lead one to conclude
that it is because they feel they have very little to lose by imposing this
additional condition of work upon women.
B. Original Intent of the Unwelcomeness Requirement
The unwelcomeness requirement comes from the EEOC Guide-
lines' definition of sexual harassment.'39 The EEOC has defended the
inclusion of this element in the prima facie.case on the ground that the
same behavior can amount to harassment or to enjoyable sexual activity,
depending on the attitudes of those involved in it.' The relevant
137. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68; Nichols v. Frank, 42 E3d 503, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1994).
138. See, e.g., Reed, 939 E2d at 492; Meritor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 42-43.
139. 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a) (1981); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
140. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amid Curiae at 13, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) No. 84-
1979 [hereinafter EEOC Brief]. The need for this requirement appears rooted in
the fear of false claims. The EEOC claimed that the requirement was designed to
.ensure that sexual harassment charges do not become a tool by which one party to
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distinction, then, is between a mutual, consensual, intimate, or dating
relationship between co-workers, and unwanted sexual attentions in the
office. It is undeniable that coworkers often become romantically in-
volved. Assuming that they occupy the same rung on the office ladder
(or work on different ladders of the same company), the consensual and
mutual sexual activities in which they engage should not form the basis
for sexual harassment claims brought by one against the other."'
But how did this self-evident notion become the often difficult
hurdle of "unwelcomeness?" The answer lies in part in the parallels
between the sexual harassment claim and the criminal offense of rape,
premised on shared assumptions about the nature of women and of
male-female interaction. It also lies in part in the judicial gloss placed
on the unwelcomeness requirement, that the conduct be unwelcome in
the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense
that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. It is
possible to interpret the two halves of this definition as saying the same
thing: conduct is unwelcome if the employee does not want it. Yet it is
hardly surprising that the trial judge in Burns v. McGregor Electronic
Industries4 2 viewed this definition as describing a disjunctive test. For
many judges, the question of what sort of behavior by a woman should
be considered an invitation to, or solicitation of, sexual conduct,
prompts a very different response than the question of whether the
behavior was wanted by the woman. Under the first standard, the court
can feel justified in considering whether the plaintiff "asked for it" by
her speech, comportment, or appearance.
Instead, courts should recognize the humble and self-evident
origins of the unwelcomeness requirement and treat its meaning as
straightforward: propositions, contact and comments that are not
wanted are unwelcome. The unwelcomeness requirement is not about
what the defendant thought the plaintiff wanted or about what the
court thinks the plaintiff deserved. It is a simple mechanism for
a consensual relationship may punish the other." EEOC Brief at 15. The problems
with this assumption have been discussed above and will not be repeated here.
141. The assumption that they occupy the same rung is important because it can be
questioned whether persons whose employment relationship is hierarchical can ever
have a truly equal sexual relationship. Even if the answer is yes, consensual relation-
ships in such a context merit some scrutiny in order to identify possible exploitation
of the less powerfiul person.
142. 989 E2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
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recognizing that consensual sexual relationships between employees do
exist, and that they alone do not support Tide VII claims.
It is therefore incongruous that courts are so often willing to
extend the definition of unwelcomeness to situations that look nothing
like consensual sexual behavior. In cases such as Reed v. Shepard'43 and
the district court decisions in Burns,'44 the courts' conclusion is not that
the plaintiff has brought a false complaint after her consensual relation-
ship has ended. Instead, the courts find that the plaintiffs wanted to be
called sexually derogatory names, physically assaulted, repeatedly
propositioned, and wanted to work in environments festooned with
sexually explicit photos and graffiti.'45 As noted above, this result is
sometimes reached by acknowledging that the plaintiff did not really
enjoy this behavior, but that it was nonetheless solicited by her.14 If
"unwelcome" is properly defined as "unwanted," as argued earlier, it is
doubtful whether the element of welcomeness has any application in
cases where the harassing conduct is something other than sexual inter-
course or related acts.
A possible solution was proposed by Judge Hill of the Eleventh
Circuit in Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers.47 The plaintiff billing clerk
alleged that the manager of the terminal in which she worked asked her
questions about her personal life, such as whether she had a boyfriend
and whether she could become pregnant. After she refused his request
to come over to her house with a bottle of wine, he called out over the
public address system as she was leaving the office that this was her last
chance. This incident was followed by other threatening remarks. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
both the plaintiffs quid pro quo claim and on her hostile environment
claim. 4 ' On appeal, the majority of the circuit court reversed, finding
that the plaintiff had raised the requisite genuine issues of material fact
with respect to each claim.' 49
143. 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
144. The first (originally unpublished) district court decision is appended to the district
court's reported decision on remand, 807 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
145. Reed, 939 E2d at 486, 492; Burns, 989 E2d at 508, 514.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. 830 E2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
148. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1556.
149. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1565.
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Judge Hill concurred in the decision to reverse on the quid pro
quo claim. 5' However, he dissented from the decision of the majority
to reverse the grant of summary judgment on the hostile environment
claims. In his view, hostile environment claims required a different
standard of employer liability because the employer had less reason to
know of "biases woven into the environment."1 51 Judge Hill then went
on to offer another justification for treating hostile environment cases as
a distinct category of Title VII claims:
... [T]he standard the court chooses must recognize that
racial and gender discrimination differ. In both instances we
find patently offensive types of conduct which cannot be
justified and which the law demands be rectified. And yet in
cases of gender discrimination we find a second and more
subtle strain of conduct which may or may not be offensive
given the relationship between the parties at a given time.
I would propose the following two-step test for analyzing
hostile environment situations. First, it must be determined
whether or not the allegedly discriminatory behavior was
ambiguously or patently offensive. Where the conduct was
patently offensive and the offending individual was the plain-
tiffs "supervisor, the inquiry may end: with or without notifi-
cation of the wrong, the employer may be held liable.
However, where it is found that the supervisor's behavior
was ambiguous, i.e., less than overtly offensive, a second find-
ing must be made as to whether the plaintiff, by some objec-
tive action at the time of the allegedly offensive conduct,
displayed objection to the conduct of the supervisor.1 2
In a footnote, the majority rejects Judge Hill's distinction as un-
necessary and unhelpful, "considering that most complaints of sexual
harassment are based on actions which, although they may be permissi-
ble in some settings, are inappropriate in the workplace."153 As the cases
discussed above indicate, however, a good deal of the conduct
150. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1566.
151. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1566.
152. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1566-67.
153. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1561 n.13.
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ultimately considered welcome is equally inappropriate outside the
workplace, even in the context of an otherwise mutual intimate rela-
tionship. Judge Hill's test can fairly be rejected as unworkable, but the
premise on which it is based should not be so easily dismissed.
C. Racial Harassment
The hostile environment sexual harassment claim was based on
similar Tide VII claims arising from racially hostile work environ-
ments. 154 In these first hostile environment cases, the concept of
welcomeness is not mentioned. Rather, the courts require proof of
sufficiently severe race-based harassment, and of the appropriate precur-
sors for employer liability.155 As the development of the hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim began to outpace that of the analogous
claim for racial harassment, courts began relying on the jurisprudence
developed in sexual harassment cases in their adjudication of cases of
racial harassment.'56 Yet, even in cases where the courts apply an identi-
cal test for racial harassment claims, the element of unwelcomeness is
generally ignored. 57
In Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 158 the Eleventh Circuit specifi-
cally rejected the use of identical tests for racial and sexual hostile
environment cases. 159 Rather, it reaffirmed the basic two-part test for
racial harassment claims, focusing on whether there was proof of
repeated racial slurs that would adversely affect the reasonable
employee's ability to do the job, and proof of employer tolerance or
condonation. 60 Even the criticism of this decision has failed to address
154. See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 E2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977);
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972);
EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
155. See Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F Supp. at 384-86 (stating that harassment
must be more than isolated, casual, or sporadic; the employer is liable if manage-
ment knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take affirmative
remedial steps).
156. See, e.g., Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 E2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (following
Henson v. City of Dundee) (holding that harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so
as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment).
157. See, e.g., Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 E Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
158. 858 E2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988).
159. Id.
160. Davis, 858 E2d at 348 & n.1, 349 (6th Cir. 1988). This two-step test actually
includes four of the five dements generally required for the plaintiff's prima facie
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the disparity regarding the unwelcomeness element.'61
In one racial harassment case, an argument akin to that of
welcomeness through participation was advanced.162 The black male
plaintiff in Vaughn v. Pool Offihore Co. was employed on an offshore
oil-rig.' 63 He complained that he was constructively discharged by
reason of a racially hostile work environment arising from pranks and
comments made on the rig. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's
finding that the work environment was not polluted with racial harass-
ment." While the employees did use terms such as "nigger," "coon"
and "black boy" when referring to the plaintiff, the court found that
"Vaughn joined in similar opprobriums which, insofar as the record
reflects, were bandied back and forth without apparent hostility or
racial animus. Indeed, the relations between Vaughn and the other Pool
employees, aside from the crude excesses of the platform atmosphere,
were friendly and cordial." 165 The court similarly found that, while the
plaintiff never participated in the physical pranks, these activities were a
form of hazing to which all employees were equally subjected at some
point.' 66
Unfortunately, the court in Vaughn does not explain whether the
"similar opprobriums" employed by the plaintiff were racial in nature or
case in a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. It is obviously implicit in the
Davis test that the plaintiff must be a member of an affected group and that the
harassment be racial in nature. Thus, the only element of the sexual harassment
claim that is entirely missing from the racial harassment claim is that of
unwelcomeness. There is also some difference between the two tests in the wording
used to describe the unreasonableness standard.
161. Lisa Rhode, Note, The Sixth Circuit's Double Standard in Hostile Work Environment
Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 58 U. CrN. L. Rev. 779 (1989). Rhode
argues that while the use of different standards for determining unreasonableness is
unwarranted, courts must retain the unwelcomeness requirement for sexual harass-
ment because sexual speech and conduct "serve a societal purpose." Rhode, supra, at
813. Racial speech, on the other hand, should be presumed to be unwelcome,
"because the nature of racial epithets are intrinsically offensive." Rhode, supra, at
815. In accepting this difference, Rhode ignores her own point that ".... when a
female minority employee brings both types of hostile work environment claims
against her employer..., the court will have the difficult task of considering the
same incidents under different standards in evaluating the merits of each claim."
Rhode, supra, at 813.
162. Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 E2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982).
163. Vaughn, 683 E2d at 923.
164. Vaughn, 683 E2d at 925.
165. Vaughn, 683 E2d at 924.
166. Vaughn, 683 E2d at 924-25.
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whether they were made in response to the slurs of others. Thus, the
decision can be read as saying that the harassment was not racial in
nature, that the plaintiff was not really bothered by it, or that it was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive, in addition to being interpreted as
barring relief because of the plaintiffs own participation. Ultimately,
the thrust of the court's reasoning on this point is that if the plaintiff
participated in the racial comments, he must not have minded them
very much.
This decision is interesting because it shows that the same sort of
"welcomeness" argument that is advanced in sexual harassment cases
may, on certain facts, be available in the racial harassment context as
well. Yet, the courts never consider the plaintiffs actions in a racial
harassment case in terms of whether or not he or she "welcomed" the
harassment. The plaintiffs participation is just one factor considered
when deciding whether the harassment was based on race, or whether it
was sufficiently pervasive to meet the Tide VII threshold. 67
D. Rethinking Unwecomeness
In considering whether a similar approach should be taken in
sexual harassment cases, the first question that must be asked is whether
an unwelcomeness requirement should be used at all. In some sense, the
answer must be yes, given the self-evident proposition that coworkers
do sometimes engage in consensual sexual activities. However, this
concept should not form part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. The
idea of having the plaintiff in all cases prove that the defendant's con-
duct is unwanted is an inappropriate echo of criminal rape law. Even if
one accepts the validity of the presumption of consent in criminal rape
law, the justifications offered for its existence in that context are wholly
inapplicable to sexual harassment actions. These are civil claims, and the
allocation of the burden of proof does not carry with it the same kinds
of normative implications present in defining offenses for criminal law
purposes. Tide VII employment discrimination suits are not intent-
based claims. 6 ' There is no unfairness or potential constitutional in-
fringement inherent in placing the burden of showing welcomeness on
the defendant.
167. For a similar approach in the sexual harassment context, see Carr v. Allison Gas
Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994).
168. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 E2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Similarly, the argument that removing the non-consent element of
the rape offense presumptively criminalizes all sexual behavior finds no
analog in the sexual harassment context. The vast majority of the
behavior plaintiffs complain about in hostile environment cases cannot
plausibly be described as falling within the category of behavior that
Judge Hill in Sparks sees as "ambiguously... offensive" or, in other
words, as potentially part of a consensual intimate relationship. 1
70
Simply as a matter of probabilities, it is far more likely that a woman
does not want sexual attentions from a given male coworker than that
she does.17
1
The idea of welcomeness is wholly inapplicable in cases where the
conduct is not specifically solicited. To argue that welcomeness is
presumed and that unwelcomeness must be proven is to assume that
sexual comments or physical touching are wanted by women at work.
In the case where the defendant has taken no steps to ascertain whether
his attentions might be welcome, or where his initial overtures are
explicitly sexual, there is no room for the operation of "welcomeness,"
even as a defense.' 72
If unwelcomeness is presumed and the defendant, in the appropri-
ate circumstances, is given the opportunity to show "welcomeness," the
next issue is whether the same factors currently invoked as relevant to
this standard should continue to be utilized. As discussed earlier, reli-
ance on recent complaint, resistance, and past sexual behavior evidence
should be abandoned as not logically probative of the issue of whether
the plaintiff affirmatively desired the sexual behavior initiated by the
defendant. 73 Similarly, the defendant's mistaken belief in welcomeness
should be considered irrelevant. This leaves the defendant with the
argument that the plaintiff wanted to participate in the events of which
she now complains.
Testimony in support of this assertion will of necessity include
reference to the statements and conduct of the plaintiff. However, there
are significant problems with the manner in which the courts scrutinize
the behavior and speech of the plaintiff at work in order to determine
the existence of such participation. Courts tend to view everything that
169. Sparks, 830 E2d at 1566.
170. Of course, the same can be said for the criminal offense of rape.
171. Again, the same can be said for rape.
172. The same critique holds true for rape.
173. See supra part IIlA.
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happened in a given workplace as a whole. From an analytical perspec-
tive, the plaintiffs prima facie case should focus on the basis of the
complaint: the behavior of the defendant, including the meaning of this
behavior and its severity. Whether the plaintiffs own actions indicate
that the conduct was welcome should be considered at a later stage.
Similarly, while the evidence of third parties may shed light on
factual disputes and issues of credibility, how other employees felt about
the defendant's behavior and the appropriateness of the plaintiffs
reaction to it is of minimal relevance. Such witnesses typically have an
interest in preserving their positions within the company. Some may
also find it psychologically necessary to deny their own experiences of
workplace harassment. The judge should not allow these witnesses to sit
as a de facto jury. In this way, instead of concluding at the outset that
sexual horseplay was rampant in the workplace, such that the stage is
set for a finding that there is no real perpetrator and no real victim, the
court can effectively focus on the specifics of the plaintiffs claim and
the evidence tendered by her in support of it.
Perhaps the most significant problem is that the courts tend to
treat all conduct or speech that can possibly be viewed as sexual in
nature, regardless of its source or context, as evidence that the defen-
dant's conduct was not unwelcome. Instances of such behavior on the
part of the plaintiff are lined up against those of the defendant, and it
is only if the plaintiff can show a marked disparity that it will be deter-
mined that the harassment was unwelcome.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Reed v. Shepard74 is an example
of such an approach. There, the court relied on the plaintiffs frequent
use of obscene language, her exhibitionism,' and her participation in
suggestive gift giving as evidence that she welcomed being handcuffed,
maced, beaten, and having her head pushed underwater. The court
repeatedly described the plaintiff as "reveling in" the sexual horseplay,
although most of the testimony of colleagues appeared to focus on the
plaintiffs frequent use of sexual language and humor.176 Indeed, the
district court's holding, affirmed by the circuit court, was expressed in
174. 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
175. The plaintiff did not wear a bra to work and "enjoyed exhibiting to the male
officers the abdominal scars she received from her hysterectomy which necessarily
involved showing her private area." Reed, 939 F.2d at 487.
176. Reed, 939 E2d at 487, 491.
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those terms: "The Court finds that language and sexually explicit jokes
were used around plaintiff because of her personality.... 7
Some appellate decisions do address the failure of trial courts to
give more than superficial attention to the content of, and impetus for,
the various statements and behaviors that are alleged by the parties to
contribute to a sexualized work environment. In Wyerick v. Bayou Steel
Corp.,' 7' the plaintiff was employed on the night shift as a crane opera-
tor. During one of her shifts, she reported to the first aid station with
complaints of chest pain and breathing difficulties. The first aid atten-
dant administered an electrocardiogram (EKG), which required that the
plaintiff remove her shirt. At a company meeting held a few weeks
later, the plaintiff complained about the quality of medical care she had
received. Following the meeting, she was subjected to various crude
comments by coworkers and supervisors, both in person and over the
company radio, about the EKG procedure. Specifically, one employee
said that he was going to become a gynecologist so that he could mas-
sage the plaintiffs, breasts, while a supervisor opined that the emergency
medical technician had a "hard-on" while performing the EKG.
Numerous such remarks were made, sometimes as often as two or three
times per day.'79
Nonetheless, the district court judge granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, stating:
[Aiccording to the papers that I have, I don't find any genu-
ine issue of material fact on the issue of sexual harassment
inasmuch as any harassment-any harassment out there was
directed to both the males and the females, and the plaintiff
participated in it and admitted that she used similar types of
language to these men.'
The Fifth Circuit reversed. While agreeing that the radio transmitters
were frequently used by employees for social discussions of a sexual
nature, and that work terminology was often charged with sexual con-
notations, the court noted that the plaintiffs participation was limited
to three retorts made in response to the insults and comments of
177. Reea 939 E2d at 491-92 (emphasis added).
178. 887 E2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989).
179. Wyerick, 887 F.2d at 1271.
180. Wyerick, 887 F.2d at 1273.
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others. 1 ' Moreover, the gravamen of the plaintiff's lawsuit was the
specific comments, jokes, and gestures related to her EKG.1 2
The Seventh Circuit decision in Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div.,
General Motors Corp."3 directly confronts the problem of plaintiff
participation in d workplace permeated with sexual speech and behavior.
There, the plaintiff was a drill operator in the gas turbine division. Her
male coworkers were unhappy with the presence of a woman in the
shop and made their displeasure known with comments such as, "I
won't work with any cunt." "' They continuously referred to her as
"whore," "cunt," and "split tail" and defaced her work area and equip-
ment with sexual signs, photos, and graffiti.8 5 The men hung pictures
of nude women around the shop and stripped to their underwear in
front of her when changing.8 6 One coworker exhibited his penis to
Carr on two occasions; another threw a burning cigarette at her.8 7 This
harassment continued over a period of five years despite the plaintiffs
complaints to her supervisor.
While the district court judge rejected the suggestion that the
conduct was mere "shop talk," and instead found it offensive and
harassing, he concluded that it was not actionable since it had been
"invited."' The district court judge relied on the testimony of a female
welder who stated that Carr was vulgar and unladylike because she used
"the F word" and told dirty jokes. 8 9 He concluded that the plaintiffs
use of terms such as "fuck head" and "dick head," placement of her
hand on the thigh of a young male coworker, and willingness to point
out the clitoris in a pornographic photo when asked to do so by co-
workers, meant that she ". . . was just as responsible for any hostile
181. Wyerick, 887 E2d at 1273 n.4. Specifically, the plaintiff told an individual who had
joked about her weight and appearance for over three months that he had never had
a good woman, and that he "wouldn't know what a good woman would be." She
also called one coworker a "motherfucker" and another a "whoremongler" [sic] in
response to insults of a similar kind which they had directed at her.
182. Wyerick, 887 F.2d at 1273.
183. 32 E3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994).
184. Carr, 32 E3d at 1009.
185. Carr, 32 E3d at 1009.
186. Carr, 32 E3d at 1009.
187. Carr, 32 E3d at 1009-10. The activities described are an abbreviated version of the
harassment reported by Carr. The decision refers to numerous other instances of
similar behavior.
188. Car, 32 E3d at 1010.
189. Car, 32 E3d at 1010.
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sexual environment that consequently arose."'19 Thus, "the tinners'
conduct, to the extent it may have constituted sexual harassment, was
not unwelcome."'
91
On appeal Judge Posner rejected this conclusion and stated for the
majority-
Of course it was unwelcome. A plaintiffs words, deeds and
deportment can cast light on whether her coworkers' treat-
ment of her was unwelcome and should have been perceived
as such by them and their supervisors, but we do not under-
stand General Motors to be suggesting that Carr enjoyed or
appeared to enjoy the campaign of harassment against her. 192
He distinguished the facts before him from those of Reed v. Shepard,'1"
noting that the plaintiff there had manifested an "enthusiastic receptive-
ness" to the sexual activities in her workplace, and stated:
What the judge found, rather, was that Carr had provoked the
misconduct of her coworkers. Had she been ladylike, he
thought, like the welder, they would have left her alone....
Even if we ignore the question why "unladylike" behavior
should provoke not a vulgar response but a hostile, harassing
response, and even if Carr's testimony that she talked and
acted as she did in an effort to be "one of the boys" is (de-
spite its plausibility) discounted, her words and conduct can-
not be compared to those of the men and used to justify their
conduct and exonerate the employer. [citations omitted]. The
asymmetry of positions must be considered. She was one
woman; they were many men. Her use of terms like "fuck
head" could not be deeply threatening, or her placing her
hand on the thigh of one of her macho coworkers intimidat-
ing; and it was not she who brought the pornographic picture
to the "anatomy lesson." We have trouble imagining a situa-
tion in which male factory workers sexually harass a lone
woman in self-defense as it were; yet that at root is General
190. Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
191. Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
192. Cart, 32 E3d at 1011 (citation omitted).
193. 939 E2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Motors' characterization of what happened here. It is incredi-
ble on the admitted facts.194
Judge Coffey, in dissent, was of the view that the facts as found
were indistinguishable from those of Reed. In a footnote he noted that
Carr's explanation for why she tolerated the sexually explicit working
environment-that she wanted to get along with her coworkers and to
be accepted by them-was identical to that offered by Reed.' 9 Judge
Coffey apparently took a similar view of the persuasiveness of Carr's
explanation as the court did in Reed, noting, "[if Carr's allegations
were true, I doubt she would have waited over three years to make
them known."' 96 He chose not to repeat the sexual language attributed
to Carr, asserting, "I do not believe that quoting vulgar language con-
tributes to the development of the body of law."l' 7
In one respect, Judge Coffey is correct: the facts in Carr are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from those of Reed. Both plaintiffs worked in
male-dominated, sexually explicit environments, both endured signifi-
cant periods of time in those environments before leaving, and both
ascribed instances of their own participationf in sexually explicit speech
and conduct to their desire to be accepted by their coworkers. The only
difference between the decisions is the depth at which the courts in
each case scrutinized the factual setting of the complaint.
In Reed, the court focused on instances of sexual or profane behav-
ior on the part of the plaintiff to reach a conclusion about her "person-
ality," and thus concluded that she must have welcomed the physical
and sexual abuse she received.' 9" In Carr, the majority rejects this
provocation defense in favor of a consideration of whether the plaintiff
"enjoyed or appeared to enjoy' the specific instances of harassment that
formed the basis of her complaint.199 The latter is a more appropriate
method of determining unwelcomeness. Surely, if a plaintiff in her
complaint based her hostile environment Title VII claim on a general-
ized assertion that her workplace was replete with sexual speech and
behavior, she would be required to produce more detail as to the source
and content of specific incidents which she found harassing. Courts
194. Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
195. Carr, 32 E3d at 1013 n.1.
196. Carr, 32 E3d at 1013 n.1.
197. Car, 32 E3d at 1015.
198. Reed, 939 F.2d at 491-92.
199. Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
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must require such detail in analyzing the events recounted by both
plaintiffs and defendants. The courts should focus on the specific acts
complained of by the plaintiff and whether the evidence indicates that
the plaintiff welcomed those behaviors in particular, not whether she
"provoked" or "deserved" them.
The majority in Carr also recognizes the multiple hierarchies
present in the workplace at issue. The court acknowledges and rejects
the prevailing standards of "ladylike" behavior and acceptable "shop
talk" in traditionally male jobs. 2°0 The majority also goes beyond the
obvious hierarchy of supervisor/subordinate to identify hierarchies of
numbers, size, and gender itself.20' Blind adherence to "gender
neutrality" ignores the fact that the same comment may have a very
different meaning and effect depending on the person who says it.
The situation is analogous to racial harassment, where retorts by
the targeted minority worker, even if racial in nature, cannot carry the
same sting as those made by whites from their position of dominance.
Courts are generally able to understand that an otherwise
nonthreatening comment may become coercive when made within the
context of a hierarchy. A boss's request for a date is not the same as
that of a coworker. A raised fist is less threatening from a lone
individual, or from a small one, than it is from a group of people or
from a person with obvious physical strength. The assertion of
dominance or sexual flexing of muscles that is an integral component of
sexual harassment is affected by these hierarchies, as well as by the
hierarchy of gender.
Courts, then, must consider the actual content of specific incidents
of potentially sexually harassing behavior in the context of these hierar-
chies. Similarly, the behavior and demeanor of the plaintiff must also be
viewed contextually and with precision. Too often, qualitatively differ-
ent behavior on the part of the plaintiff has been equated with that of
the defendant merely because they both involve sexuality or profanity.
Moreover, courts have been slow to comprehend reasons apart from
enjoyment that women might participate to a certain degree.
CONCLUSION
The prohibition of workplace sexual harassment, and its division
into the quid pro quo and hostile environment categories, is the result
200. Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
201. See Carr, 32 E3d at 1011.
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of judicial interpretation of Tide VII's proscription of sex discrimina-
tion in employment. The inclusion in hostile environment claims of an
unwelcomeness requirement in the plaintiffs prima facie case represents
a further administrative and judicial gloss on this statutory guarantee.
The content given to the unwelcomeness requirement is yet another
layer of judicial definition and explanation. The result of this reasoning
is that the plaintiff is presumed to have welcomed the harassment, and
that the legal understanding of "unwelcomeness" is heavily infused with
the doctrines that framed the traditional criminal law of rape. Such an
approach persists in the sexual harassment area despite the sustained
criticism of these ideas in the rape law context.
Relying on the Supreme Court's discussion of unwelcomeness in
Meritor Savings, subsequent lower court decisions have proceeded from
a presumption of welcomeness and scrutinized the plaintiffs sexual
history, her appearance and conduct at work, and her failure to resist
the harassment or to make a prompt complaint. Some Canadian tribu-
nals have added the additional requirement that the complainant show
that the defendant knew or ought to have known that his actions were
unwelcome.
These considerations mirror the attitudes about women's sexual
receptiveness and propensity for deception that feminists have found so
hard to exorcise from the criminal law of rape. The reappearance of
these attitudes in an action designed to redress sex inequality is particu-
larly ironic and a testament to the ubiquitousness of sexism in law. The
focus on the plaintiff and what she might have done to provoke or
deserve the harassment obscures the way in which acquiescence is the
exact response the harasser wishes to evoke. While reforms to the law of
evidence regarding the irrelevance of sexual history and resistance may
be useful, such solutions do not guarantee a shift in a court's attention
to the actions of the defendant and his impact on the plaintiffs equality
in her workplace.
There is no justification in a civil action for continuing to presume
that a woman welcomes any and all sexual advances made by her co-
workers. The element of unwelcomeness should be removed from the
prima facie case, and the burden should be on the defendant to show
that the plaintiff actually wanted the impugned conduct. An argument
of welcomeness by the defendant should not be seriously entertained
where the impugned conduct is outside the parameters of a potentially
consensual relationship. Welcomeness would not be in issue, in other
words, where the defendant's comments consist of sexual remarks or
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slurs, physical interference on the job, pornographic photos or objects,
or sexual contact not preceded by a mutual expression of interest.
Welcomeness should only be invoked in the unusual case in which a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim is based on sexual inter-
course or related behavior and where the defendant can establish that
the impugned conduct was mutual, consensual, and unaffected by
workplace hierarchies.
Sexual conduct should not be considered welcome because the
judge or the jury or the plaintiffs coworkers think the plaintiff deserved
it or should have liked it. The focus should remain on the defendant
with the understanding that men have a duty not to harass the women
with whom they work. As Judge Posner recognizes in Carr, "'welcome
sexual harassment' is an oxymoron.... ."202 Under this approach, sexual
history evidence must be considered wholly irrelevant, and evidence of
the plaintiffs conduct at work in relation to the incident in question
considered with specificity and in the context of the operative
workplace hierarchies. Nothing less will suffice to vindicate the equality
guaranteed to women at work. t
202. Carr, 32 Ed at 1008.
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